

# Innovations

## The Post-Cold War Political Relations between China-Sudan

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**Abstract:** *This paper deals the political relations of China and Sudan since the post cold war. It identifies and analyzes key manifestation of China's relationship with Sudan with regard to non-interference, Human rights, China's position in the Darfur conflict the cost of development induced displacement and China-Sudan military cooperation and China's shading of the Sudanese government from the allegation of international criminal court, is discussed Not surprisingly, bilateral relations between countries invariably encompass interests and constraint. China-Sudan, post cold war economic and political relations has posed both challenges and opportunities. China's non-interference principle, protecting the Sudan regime from pressure of international community caused confrontation with the Western countries. Using the principle as a tool to prevent others not to intervene, it provided weapons, in exchange of oil money and investment opportunities. Consequently, using the military hard-wares imported from China the regime enhanced gross violations of human rights, such as, torture, mass killings and detention. Embargoes, sanction and resolution on the Sudan regime for its human rights catastrophe were annulled and acquitted by China arguing that responding the Situation in Sudan is an internal problem deserved to be solved internally. Furthermore, the two countries' have forwarded their political interest globally; Sudan supported China's membership in the UN Security Council in 1970s, and it was defeated its human rights allegation in 1980s at the UN human rights council by the support of African countries including Sudan. On China part, it was supported a unified Sudan, opposing the South Sudan independency. The objective of the thesis is to explore the political relationships between the two countries in the post cold war period. To ascertain this, predominantly qualitative with minimal level of quantitative research methodologies are employed. Both primary and secondary sources of data are utilized. By doing this, the study demonstrated issues such as, Western pressure on China to drag its diplomatic ally, internal dynamics in Sudan such as, security factor and the secession of South Sudan, as obstacles for their relations.*

**Key words:** *Sudan, China, Politics, China's Human Rights Policies, Military Relations.*

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**1 Background:** During the Cold War, China's primary interests in Africa were to stand against the interest of the United States and the Soviet Union, and more importantly, to promote the one China Policy. But later on, its approach changed to one of political diplomacy and, search of extractive industries or economic motives (Wang, 2010:33). Despite their diplomatic relations established in 1959, their economic relations was commenced, after the visit of President Jaafar Nimerri to China requesting oil development in 1970 (Morro, 2009:3). China in this period has not the skill and the capital to respond Nimeiri's request. As a result, between 1970s up to the end of Nimeiri's regime in 1989, their relations was nominal (ibid: 22).

It was after the post Cold War period, their relations took a new stage. This was as a result of two incidents in both countries. The first was, the National Islamic Front (NIF/NCP) in Sudan took power in 1989 through coup d'état. And the second was the incidence in Tiananmen Square in June, 1989, where peaceful demonstrators were massacred by soldiers of the PRC, and many were tortured and detained (Large 2008a: 94). As a result of this incidence, western countries were condemned China and imposing military embargo and economic sanctions unanimously (Ibid). Therefore, China sought African countries in general and specific countries like Sudan in particular as an alternative ally. Conveniently, African countries on the other hand, were quick to rush to support Beijing in the face of the intense criticism by the West (Taylor, 2006:60). This converged interest pulled both countries' to integrate their relations after the aforementioned period (Large, 2008:95). As it mentioned above, between 1960 and 1989 Chinese relations with Sudan was characterized with limited diplomatic relations and minor economic involvement. Sudan exported, cotton, sesame, vegetable, where as China was exported military weapons, textile products, detergents with offering its first comparatively small loan and aid package in the 1970s (Shinn, 2009:87). Similar to that of President Nimeiri's visit, in the 1970s President al-Bashir also visited China in 1995 to request e in the development of oil resources. China immediately admitted the request by way of signing an oil development agreement between the government of Sudan and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1996 (Morro, 2009:3). As a result, from mid 1990, Sino-Sudanese relations developed from limited diplomatic connections, to be regular and more cooperative in economic and political terms (Large, 2008:87). Besides government intimacy, they also employed party to party relations as well. They are complimented by extensive political contacts, involving regular tours by leading CCP officials such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and cooperative agreements between key members of the Sudanese and Chinese governing political elites (Large, 2007:58).

China supported Sudan's interests in international institutions, and used its UN Security Council seat to block or dilute resolutions against Sudan. For instance an economic sanction imposed by the UN in 1996 and by the US in 1997 due to the party's ideology and its ties to terrorism was intervened by China in its development endeavors (Halper,2010:100). In return, al-Bashir's administration favored Chinese State Owned Enterprises(SOEs), provided lucrative contracts and supported China at international forums publicly backing one China policy and voting in favor of China at the UN (Shinn, 2009:91).Hence, as Zambels (2011; 56), argued, China's commercial and economic interest in Sudan has increasingly come to take precedence over political interest. As mentioned above at (Shinn, 2009:87), the cordial relations of the two countries has emancipated since 1960, but they don't have regular interaction then after. Their relations intensified after the burgeoning of the Chinese economy highly demanded energy resources in early 90s coupled with Sudan's oil development interest. So, their economic interest, which oil taken as a central became a reason to maximize Political sway of bilateral relations (Large,2009:11). And as it can refer in section, 4.2.1, below, China's main drive to Sudan is economic specifically, oil which surpassed political motives (Ibid).

## **2. China's Non-Interference Doctrine:**

China reaffirmed, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as a guiding of its foreign policy with Africa (Taylor 1998: 451). These are, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, since the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 (PRC, 2000). Despite these principles are emerged into the stage of politics after 1955, they were formed in 1950s and matured in the 1980s. The principle, non-interference is one of them which China is contested China's relations with its allies in the contemporary period. (Jackobson,2007:239).

China's role in African domestic politics and economic approaches has been guided by this principle which it deems as the internal affairs of other states. This is because the Chinese government itself does not allow others to interference in its own domestic affairs. And it didn't itself either. China's stand to it as, (cited in Anthoy, 2012:2), states, "don't do to others you don't want have done to yourself." The Chinese government advocates that national governments alone should be the focus on matters relating to domestic matters (Iyasu, 2011). China's approach to this principle was to increase friendship, while seeking the trust and cooperation of friendly political parties and regimes in African countries (Osakwe, 2012). China believes that, through non-interference it is able to maintain stable relations with foreign governments and ensure that economic cooperation is unaffected by political change (Potter, 2012:11).

China protect other's not to interfere in Sudan's domestic affairs .It believes that, Sanction or interference is not a solution to solve confrontation rather political solution and dialogue can reap the situation and come up with durable peace .1 This could be addressed putting the conflicting party on the table (Iyasu, 2011:66). For most African countries including Sudan, the policy of non-interference is more attractive factor in their partnership with China (Ayenagbo, et.al, 2012). Because, China was willing to overlook and underdog corruption instability and human rights violations, while helping host country. Rather buildup economic, political and military muscles with no attached conditions (Zha, 2006:67-68). However, there are growing concerns that the policy is merely to benefit Chinese business and investment interest in Africa. Because, it is a shadow of contemporary conflicts and socio-political realities of the continent that, China used to approach. This issue to the fact that, the application of the policy has been fixed to feet Chinese interest at the cost of human rights and good governance (Festus, 2013:20).

In the case of Sudan which is China's key trading partner and major oil supplier from Africa, despite China's claims of non-interference policy, it was involved in the domestic affairs of the country to protect its economic interests. China supplied the Sudan government with arms and weaponry.<sup>2</sup> During the Darfur crisis and the civil war with the South; though it was prohibited and sanctioned by the international community it was delivered armaments (Hilsum, 2008:26). These arms were used for persistent and systematic violations of human rights in Darfur and during the North-South civil war by government forces. So, the supply of arms to a country which is recognized as abuser of its citizen by the international organization shows a transcendence of its non-interference doctrine (Friedman, 2010:96).

China's approach to Sudan is after the withdrawal of Western oil firms from Sudan in the mid 90s. Their resignation was twofold, firstly, in protest against Sudanese government for its human right record and, secondly security threats by rebel force against their firms and workers. This scenario and the invitation of president al-Bashir pulled China to involve and substitute the western firms in the Sudan's oil sector (Large, 2008a:18). Doing this, the Chinese investment in oil in Sudan has been to intensify the cruel act of the regime and enable to upper hand its political and becoming more pariah and repressive (Ibid: 21). As Elijah Aleng, (Cited in, HRF, 2008:13), stated," When you exploit oil and resources, nothing goes to the population, then you are financing the war against them with resources and that is not acceptable." Sudan which is a partner of China's government is widely known to pursue policies of mass human rights abuses in spite of this, China refuse to condemn the perpetrating regime for its human right violations, rather it supports financially, military, and gave political shield(HRF,2008: 12). As Boukoro stated this:-

The principle of non-interference has served to safeguard China's own sovereign rights. In the case of human rights China and most African nations argue that state

sovereignty is paramount not least because the human rights protection regime is a state based mechanism. A non-interference principle holds that human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another's internal affairs. (Boukoro, 2010:43).

For this reason, Beijing's support for right abusing regimes of Sudan was undermined and incurred reciprocity on its investment projects. China's close economic ties to repressive states both obstruct international efforts to promote violations of human rights, and also carry hazardous political consequences for China which shed its reputation from outside and the militant in Sudan (HRF, 2008:13).The SPLA and the people of Darfur believe that China is a partner for the genocidal government in Khartoum and it is interfering in domestic affairs of Sudan by supporting the regime in power (Morten, 2008:17).Firstly, conditions contributing to the conflict in Darfur were undoubtedly highlighted by the importance of actual oil money after 1999 which contributed to the grievances of rebels and the real economic and political marginalization suffered in Darfur (Large 2008c: 7).Secondly, capital flowing to the central government from the largely Chinese funded oil industry directly financed the war making activities of the predatory Sudanese state against the populace of Darfur (Salih 2007: 36).. For instance, in 2007 and 2008, China's made;350, battle tanks, 25 light tanks,44 combat planes and 28 attack helicopters were used in attacks against Darfur civilians (Darge, 2011:30). Indeed China's interference by selling arms directly worsened conflict and insecurity and led to numerous violations of human rights in Darfur. Beijing's repeatedly relied on non-interference to justify its opposition to UNSC sanctions and interventions in, whilst failing to link its oil investment and arms sales in Sudan to the atrocities, instead highlighting its humanitarian contributions. This discontent reveals clear contradictions in China's non-interference principle. Therefore, "the conflict in Darfur posed major political crisis as a result of China's non-interference policy into Sudan (Jakobson,2009:41).

Over the issue of Darfur, the meaning of non-interference was further interpreted in two ways;-firstly, China as main investor in Sudanese oil had reason to have an interest in the stability in the region due to its oil investment. China identified this problem by supporting Khartoum with weapons and armory to protect the security of the oil fields. Consequently, the government shored up its Western flank, the marginalized province of Darfur by arming the Janjaweed militias; which supplemented its regular army and launch raids on the non-Arab population base of potential rebel's supporters (ICG, 2011:5). These proxy fighters were accused of the atrocities in Darfur, and they were funded and provided with arms by the Khartoum regime, which is supported by oil revenues from China (Lee and Shalmon 2008; Raine, 2009). So without the oil revenue, the Khartoum government would-be unable to fund the Janjaweed militia (Lee and Shalmon 2008). A Sudanese refugee(cited at,

Darge, 2011:27), stated as “it is obvious that Chinese support for the government in Khartoum, military, economic, and political has made it possible for the army to continue to fight in Darfur.” In practice Beijing has not moved away from the entanglement of sovereignty and noninterference. Initially, China was objecting the interference of others in Sudan. But it shows a gradual pragmatic shift from staunch supporter of not to interference into persuasive stance then to the support of the principle. Hence, China itself has not permanent standpoint on the principle; rather manipulated it in terms of its national interest.

### **3. China’s Duplicity Position on Darfur Issue:**

The crisis in Darfur challenged China’s diplomatic stance (Holslag, 2008:83). It reaps compromise between traditional norms that, rested on the importance of non-interference in sovereign state, and accommodation of pressure to resolve Darfur problem (Ibid: 71). In 2003, full scale conflict erupted between Sudan’s government forces and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), militant from the Darfur region demanded greater political representation in the central government and a place in the ongoing North-South peace process (Flint and de Waal, 2005:76) and (Jok, 2007:126). Khartoum responded by arming the Arab militia force, the Janjaweed, and unleashing them against the (JEM), intending to drive out the non-Arab populations (Darge, 2011:27). The Janjaweed looted, burned, and decimated villages Air bombed the Darfur region, targets arbitrarily throughout the region using Chinese armaments (Meredith, 2005:599). As a result, Darfur has internationalized China’s relation with Sudan and drawn closer attention to its wider involvement in the African continent. Darfur has been described and recognized, as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis by the UN in 2004 (Jok, 2007:115). The government sponsored mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement which had made 2.5 million people entirely reliant on aid to survive, and estimated of total casualties tallied over 200,000 people (Jok, 2007:115; Watts, 2007). Beijing initially strongly opposed any efforts in intervening in the security conditions, in Darfur as was recommended by the international community (Taylor, 2011:146).

When the full extent of the Sudanese government’s military campaign in Darfur came to light in 2004, Western states particularly, UK, USA and France, sought action against Sudan in the United Nations Security Council. They posit the responsibility to protect, the Darfurians, which implied that the international community has the right and obligation to put the primacy of sovereignty aside when a state fails to protect its own citizens (Bellamy, 2005:51). However, these efforts were hampered by China. The Chinese responded that what was happening in Sudan was an internal affair that could be solved by the Sudanese central government. Beside this, the problem in Darfur is poverty, illiteracy and social and economic backwardness. Therefore,



persistence economic development is a solution instead of sanction and interference<sup>3</sup>

It is therefore clear that, just from the beginning of the crisis, the Chinese supported the stance of the Sudanese government. For example, when the Sudanese government rejected proposals for the replacement of the African Union peacekeeping force, by UN peacekeepers, China was on the same position with Sudan refused to accept (Oslo forum,2008:38 and)<sup>4</sup>.It was supported with a combination of protection and political help through high level meetings between Chinese and Sudanese government officials. (Large,2008c:8). China's diplomats opposed sanctions with its veto power and abstention of successive resolutions was regarding Darfur having been the motive of protecting its economic interests (---) the Chinese oil interests and investments in Sudan and its status as one of the principal suppliers of arms to Sudan, it is not surprising that China opposed UN sanctions and resolutions. Sanctions would have put its interests at jeopardy.[This was], something that was explicitly referred to as reason for the opposition to these resolutions and the threat to veto them by the China representative.(MFA, PRC, 2004:9 and.).Beijing asserted that “ a resolution on Darfur must come from engagement and negotiations, recognizing and respecting Khartoum as legitimate, contrary to the widely expressed western coerciveness and threats” (Loke 2009: 209). As mentioned above, Chinese foreign policy based on the, five principles specifically to non-interference and sovereignty was reinforced with its relations with Sudan (Karrar, 2010:18). The principle of, sovereignty and non-interference being the main tenets which China adopted. In the Darfur case, China meant that human rights violation in Darfur is something within the sovereignty of the Sudanese government to deal with. Because a country's sovereignty is the foremost collective human right and sovereignty is the guarantor of human rights. Interfering in the name of human rights in a sovereign state is violation of territorial integrity of the state (Xinhua, December 12, 2005).

Have been said all above, a breakthrough came in mid-2004, when China began to shift its position on the Darfur issue, no longer offering unconditional support to the Sudanese government. This was a result of a combination of international pressure calling for China to adopt a responsible stakeholder role in international affairs. And, concurrently, trends within Chinese foreign policy circles that called for review of Chinese foreign policy and the strengthening of efforts to cooperate with the other major powers (Karrar, 2010:6).Thereafter, China began a diplomatic campaign aimed at persuading the Sudanese government to Change its policy by sending special envoys such as Lu Guozeng, and met Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in 2005 and dealt about the Darfur issue (Jok,2007:115). In similar manner, the assistant minister of foreign affairs, Zhai Jun undertook four visits to Sudan and met with the president and senior officials of the Ministry of foreign affairs in Sudan. Theses

envoys urged the Sudanese government to improve the humanitarian situation in the Darfur region and not to confront with the international community through a hard line approach (ibid:8). However, Beijing's obstructionist policy began to tentatively shift more from 2005 onwards. When the Security Council passed resolutions in March 2005, where the Chinese representative began to show a more willingness to discuss the resolutions provided that the integrity of the country (Sudan) would be guaranteed (Padraig, et.al, 2008:7). Consequently, from 2006, Chinese diplomats increased their active role in trying to persuade Khartoum and cooperated with the international community in the efforts to stop the violence in Darfur (Jakobson, 2009:424). Hence, Chinese diplomacy became more visibly engaged through public official statements for ceasefire, and as individual diplomatic visits to Sudan and Darfur to pressurize the Sudan government (Holslag, 2008:80). Beijing shifted its position from fixed stance to one of active engagement and mediation by attempting to convince the regime in Khartoum (Bellamy, 2005:51). As Potter (2012:12), observed below;-In the early years of the Darfur crisis, China, true to its stated policy of non-interference, treated the Darfur situation as an internal conflict. However, over time, China changed its stance, first shifting to passive support of the government of Sudan without opposing international efforts to intervene in Darfur, and eventually beginning to play an aggressive diplomatic role in bringing the UN peacekeeping force and making more pressure on Sudan. Along this line, China sent Ambassador Zhai Jun as a special envoy to the Chinese president to meet with Sudanese president and in a meeting on 8 April 2007 and asked Al-Bashir to calm the situation, because China was under tremendous pressure for its stand due to the Darfur issue (Dagne, 2011:28). Moreover, Jun requested the government of Sudan to accept AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur, despite refused by Khartoum (Karrar, 2010:9). In similar vein during president Hu Jintao's visit to Khartoum in 2007, he demanded his Sudanese counterparts to cooperate with the international community and the Security Council. This immediately signaled the fact that China was unable to take any more stand against the Western position. Unless we [China] are called by any African country to interfere and do something to assist the respective country, we do not interfere into any African country. All African countries do not want to interfere in their domestic affairs, so if African does not want to interfere, china also keeps the interest of African people. We do not stand against the will of the people. So, China opposing non-interference. China's sending diplomat to reconcile the situation was by the request of the Sudanese government. All else aside, the appointment of Ambassador, Liu Guijin as a special envoy to Darfur reached China's climax shift on the Darfur in favor of the international community's position. China joined the West in publicly pressuring Sudan on 31 July 2007, when it supported resolution 1769, which authorized the UN to send a 26,000 peacekeeping force to Darfur (Mendith, 2005:95). China also announced that it was



sending 275 military engineers and 43 civil engineers to take part in the UN peacekeeping force in the region. As Holslag (2008a:74), asserted China's intention to divert was characterized by different scenarios; as its primary consideration was its economic ambitions which have been repeatedly spoiled by Sudan's security conditions. In fact, from 2004 onwards, escalating violence in Darfur put Chinese oil operation at risk. Chinese oil workers have been directly threatened and abducted, disappeared by separatist groups of the JEM, demanding China's resign from the region and many oil wells are at threat in the conflict areas (Large,2008b:6). Equally important, attention broadcasted to the international communities through media about the Chinese hosted Olympic Games of 2008. Activists were connected the event with the Darfur conflict, naming 'the Genocide Olympics' which China hosted to be. The campaign and the Darfur issue were about to threaten "the positive image China had wanted to project" in the eye of the international community (Budabin,2011:139). The other campaign which was entitled "Save Darfur" was successful in getting celebrities involved in the campaign. One of the most dramatic events occurred in February2008, when former artist adviser to the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympic, Hollywood star director Steven Spielberg, resigned his position from the Beijing Olympic committee membership due to pressure by 'Save Darfur' campaign (Jakobson, 2009:420).

The Chinese government thus increasingly found itself losing credibility as a responsible power and hence, status and respect in the eyes of much of the international community because of its support for a regime that was crimes against its own people. China's issues of non-intervention had previously been used by western to paint a picture of China as a responsible and non-integrated member of the international community (Carlson,2006:217).Additional more decisive move was the involvement of high ranking U.S. politicians in the campaign who raised the possibilities of a boycott of the Beijing Olympics in Congress in March 2007 (Ibid:149). This was reinforced, when Joseph Biden, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 96 other members of the senate wrote a letter to then President Hu Jintao, urging Beijing to use its influence in Sudan to help solve the crisis in Darfur. This move of the campaign to a governmental level had a decisive impact on Beijing (Carmody and Taylor, 2009:6-7).The reference to the "Genocide Olympic" by mounting humanitarian advocacy campaign inthe first half of 2007,together with the negative media attention focusing on China's role in Darfur, clearly disturbed Chinese [officials] and be used boost their efforts pressuring towards Khartoum (Reuters, 16 May,2007).

China's changing stance on the Darfur crisis suggested Beijing was a flexible and pragmatic in its application of the non-interference principle. As Ofodile rightly notes "China's leaders are pretty conservative in their principle. They will not want

to perform a major foreign policy u-turn, but these moves are a sign that they are willing to be increasingly flexible in their approach not only towards the crisis in Darfur but also other foreign policies too.” (Ofodile, 2009:9). Relative to its, stance to the principle gradually China became pragmatic, proactive and flexible. China is no longer willing to merely react to Changes in the external environment, if not embracing of multilateral diplomacy and activities a 180 degree turnabout from recent years.<sup>7</sup> Hence, it can be elucidate that, China’s position of defending the non-interference principle seen as orthodoxy is a rhetoric one which can alter its position if necessary.

#### **4.China’s Response to the ICC’s Warrant on Sudanese Officials:**

The crisis in Darfur again entered a new phase when the general attorney of the ICC, LuisMoreno Ocampo, called for the warrant of arresting for Sudanese officials including president Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. Once more, Chinese diplomacy found confronted by a new challenge as a result of the Darfur crisis (Karrar, 2010:12). China expressed its grave concerns over the ICC decision on the warrant, concerned it as “the activity of international criminal court must be benefited to the stability of the Darfur region and the accomplishment of the settlement of the crisis, not focused on individual cases.” (Iyasu, 2011:56). China once more coated and intended to impede the Sudanese officials from accusation by the court for their verdict on the conflict (Ibid). With Resolution 1593, the Security Council ordered the ICC to investigate the situation inDarfur; the Council passed the resolution as a binding measure, making it compulsory for all states to comply with these provisions. After 20 months of independent investigation, the prosecutor found reasonable evidences that, some Sudanese officials were responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. But, Khartoum called the ICC prosecutors a “junior employee doing cheap work.”(Jok 2007: 191).Sudan denied that mass crimes have been committed in Darfur and insisted that its own judiciary is competent to deal with whatever has occurred in that region. Substantially, they refused to hand over the two suspects (Harunand Ali Kushayb) to the ICC. Instead appointed them into higher position (ibid), although it “condemn deeply” the violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, believed that the perpetrators must be brought to justice (ibid).China not only, abstained from voting on the resolution 1593 ICC’s direction to investigate the alleged crimes, but it also used its muscle to prevent a strong, collective condemnation of Sudan’s non-cooperation with the ICC. This is the fact that China’s close military, political and economic relationship with the government of Sudan protected it from condemnation and further investigation (Srinivan, 2008: 67). Basically, China has been economic interest in Sudan, specifically, oil so to maintain its historical economic interest with the regime in Khartoum, it was not able to denied its

traditional political support. Because it's cooperating with the ICC could be losing its credibility and followed the negative consequence from Sudan.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, people's daily on 17 July, 2008, stated "the ICC decision poured oil on the fire and obstructed the efforts of the peaceful settlement and negotiations between the armed movements in Darfur and the Sudanese government." China believed, what were needed in Darfur at that time were the enhancement of peace and encouraging dialogue among all the parties and not the threatening of certain parties to the conflict with penalties and arrest warrants (Potter, 2010:11). To reverse this action, Chinese diplomats immediately began conducting negotiation with Washington, Russia and with a member of European capitals and to contain the impacts of the ICC's decision to freeze its decision on Sudan (Holsag, 2008:26). On 08 August 2009, Chinese representative to the UN, Ambassador Wang Guangya, took to call the Security Council to use its authorities to freeze the prosecutor of the ICC' indictments of the Sudanese president. He further stated as: In China's opinion, no progress could be expected in the Darfur peace process without the full cooperation of the Sudanese government and described the decision of the ICC as inappropriate and poorly timed, and that it would severely undermine the mutual confidence and cooperation between the UN and the Sudanese government (cited in Anshan, 2010:36).

Nevertheless, as a permanent member of the Security Council, China has been a responsibility to ensure the binding decision by the Council. China lost that fight, standing behind of Sudan, but Sudan thanked it for its effort, and stated "we do appreciate the support that China has given us in the Security Council," President Bashir's speech (cited in, HRF, 2008:8).

### **5. China's Human Rights Policies and its Implication in Sudan:**

Human rights are by implication," a set of principles ideas about the treatment to which all individuals are entitled by virtue of being human" (Schmitz & Sikkink, 2002:517). The logic therefore, is that despite the myriad different cultural practice that exists throughout the world, there is one thing that each individual has in common with each other and that is humanity. Doing this, there are certain basic humanitarian treatments to which all human beings are entitled to (Frank, 2008:198).

In order to understand the human rights practices of China in Africa, it is helpful to look its human rights nature domestically. China in fact was amongst the initial group of 48 states who adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Furthermore, China has signed and ratified the international covenant on civil and political rights. And it is an active party to the International Bill of Human rights (ibid). Despite being subject to the International Bill of rights, it maintains a culturally relativist position on human rights. Because Beijing believes that each

country has the right to interpret human rights according to its own domestic customs (Smitz and Sikkin).

Kenneth Roth (2006:20), states that, when it comes to human rights, China foreign policy is skeptic. To China, human rights are relative, and each country must have the freedom to define its own ways of human rights principle. This idea emanated from the ten affirmations that form the basis of the Beijing Declaration, which states that every state has the right to choose its “own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights.” Thus China views external intervention on the grounds of human rights as a violation of the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs (Taylor, 2005:5). However, the West believed that human rights have historically arisen from a need to protect citizens from abuse by the state, which might suggest that all nations have a duty to intervene and protect people wherever they are. But the developing countries, including China and most African nations, argue that state sovereignty is paramount, not least because the human rights protection regime is a state’s mechanism. A noninterference principle holds that human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another’s internal affairs (Wang,2010: 41). Of particular concern is the situation in Sudan, a country devastated by massive human right violations, forced displacement, in extraction of oil and conflict ridden country. Sudan is a country where China has traded arms and invested in oil resources without sufficient considerations for human rights of the population. In many ways, China’s economic relations with Sudan have affected the human rights situations therefore the worse (Amnesty Int’l:2006:1).

In this regard, it is worth nothing that, Chinese arms supply to Sudan since the 1990s have been used by the Sudanese government and militias to commit massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law (Sonya, et.al, 2012:66). Such violations have included directed and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian settlements, which have caused deaths and mass forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Planes and helicopters bought from China have been used to launch aerial bombing on villages to clean the ground, to be ready for ground troops in the armed conflict in Southern Sudan until 2004 and the Darfur from 2003 up to the end of 2006 (ibid:2). Powell testified on his article as:-To meet the demand for oil and other natural resources, China has built relationships with African states. Rich in mineral resources, but plagued by poverty and corruption, many of these states rely on oil exports to sustain their economies. This is why China has partnered with Omar al-Bashir and traded weapons for oil. These weapons are supplied to the military and militias in Sudan, who then use them to systematically kill the non-Arabs in the Darfur region of Southern-Sudan, and exacerbate the civil war (Powell, 2008:158).

Between extraction, transportation, storage and refining, and even use of oil, the development of Sudan's oil industry at all has been a Chinese production and involvement. Chinese state owned enterprises (SOE) are the main actors for the activities of these developments. China needs African development in general and Sudan in particular, so if you mention different government's peace, security and stability we provide humanitarian aid to Sudan to improve the livelihood of Sudanese people. Europeans put some criteria. the most thing about human right is development China believes development brought peace and stability

The most important for human right is economic development. Sudan has allowed Chinese companies to extract and transport crude oil for export at the same time that it has enabled the al-Bashir government to consolidate its power and violate human rights. The termination of Western companies to engage in development endeavor with oppressive regime of Sudan, allowed China to replace them and got an opportunity to import oil at cheaper price and enable to get diplomatic privilege with Sudan (Powel,2008:157). Khartoum had played a central role in these human right violations, with China's willingness. Because China was a close alliance of Sudan during the Darfur conflict and "no other power holds to influence over Khartoum as China regarding human rights" (Richardson, 2006:57).

China believes that, human rights, good governance and democracy should follow economic development. The basic feature of conflict and violations of human rights are emanated from lack of economic development. So sates such as Sudan should give a priority concern for economic development to tackle human rights violations, promote good governance and democracy. But in real and actual terms it is indisputable to assume Africans in general and Sudan in particular addresses economic development without human rights and good governance.

Since China is biggest trading partner, whom it purchases 70 % of Sudan's oil export until independence of South-Sudan, it does not want to pursue Khartoum. Because the nature of Chinese government regarding human right in its domestic is condemned by the international community and human rights activists many times. So what it did not implement in its own people can not realize in Sudan.11 Instead they used oil money from China for the war fare activities in Sudan;-Cordon noted it as:-Not only did Khartoum use Chinese oil money to fund its ethnic cleansing of southern insurgents, but China sold them the weapons to do it. In violation of a UN embargo, \$100 million worth of aircraft and small arms were sold to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir between 1996 and 2003. The Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Liu Guijin, explained, "We don't believe in embargoes. That just means that people suffer. From a practical consideration, embargoes and sanctions can't solve problems (Condon, 2012:9).

China's growing economy needs energy and draws seventy percent of its imported oil from Sudan. Putting pressure and an embargo on Khartoum to shape up on human rights, would threaten the lines of China-Sudan relations in this regard (New York Times, 16 May, 2006). What China perceives is that energy security is a backbone of economic prosperity, and this resulted to national security, which gives foreign policy implementation. Hence, maintaining energy security is at the cost of human rights (Pan, 2006, Reeve, 2006). China's Deputy foreign minister is quoted at (Brooks, 2006:44), said "business is business. We try to separate politics from business." And I think the internal situation in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose on them." And as Roth (2006:16), indicated it in other way, "when Western governments try to use economic.

## **6. Military Relations:**

Since the 1990s, China has been one of the major global suppliers of military equipment and small arms to Sudan (Kotecki, 2008: 211). Military cooperation and arms supplies constituted a significant area of state links between the two countries. (Large, 2009) noted that, China has been a prominent supplier of arms to Sudan since 1971, especially during the civil war between 1983-2005 and the Darfur conflict between 2003 and 2007. These included anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, ammunition, tanks, helicopters and fighter aircrafts. (Atrree, 2013) further stated that, China supplied 72% of the Small Arms and Light Weapons to the government of Sudan between 2001 and 2008. Another face of Chinese military cooperation in Sudan has been the assistance of Chinese companies for the building of weapon factories outside the capital, Khartoum (ibid). This is the fact that when China comes for acquiring oil from Sudan, its own part came with handful of weapons (Alden, 2005b:142). During the 1990s, control of oil producing areas and exploitation of oil became critically important to Khartoum, enabling it to generate funds and acquire arms to consolidate its power and wage war against rebel groups, such as SPLM/A (Atrree, 2012). Most of the income generated from oil sales was spent on acquiring and manufacturing arms. Between 1996 and 2006, in spite of UN Security Council embargo, Sudan bought a US\$700 million worth of aircraft and small arms from China. These were the period where oil money was emancipated as Sudan's major source of income. The kick off of the conflict in Darfur was in 2003, and it escalated within the next successive years until, the eve of 2008. Likewise, China's exporting military weapons for the country become regularly and increased in type and quantity in these years. So it could elucidate that, China was a means for the violation of human rights by the Sudan government. Sudan's aggressive purchase of arms from China has drastically risen since 1999. Arms expenditures by Khartoum in general, tripled from 1999 to 2000, then quadrupled in 2001, and climbed to fifteen-fold in



2002. It also tripled again in 2003, but dropped by one-third in 2004, and rose in 2005. By 2006, Sudan's small arms imports from China had risen to more than 680 times their 1999 levels due to the escalation conflict in Darfur (HRF,2008:21). As Miller in 2007, writes;-In exchange money for oil, Beijing provides weapons and diplomatic support. China has supplied Sudan with tanks, artillery, helicopters and fighter aircraft. China has flooded Darfur with anti-personnel mines. It is estimated as much as 80 percent of Sudan's oil revenue goes to buy arms. Beijing has also helped Sudan build its own factories to manufacture small arms and ammunition, the real weapons of mass destruction in Khartoum's campaign of ethnic cleansing. Chinese-built helicopter gunships reportedly operate from airfields maintained by the Chinese oil companies (Miller, 2007:9).Due to the escalation of the conflict, small arms were not enough to control the war. Hence, Sudan tends to engage in heavy weapons too (Shinn & Eisenmen, 2005:8). As a result, it introduced fighter aircraft or heavy arms, Mortars, and Military Trucks from China to Sudan (Xinua, 2006:29).

According to the 2006 Amnesty International report, China has also been supplying Sudan with military vehicles and military expertise too. They found 222 vehicles were acquired from Dongfeng Automobile of China. In October, 2005 for instance, Chinese commanders and the Sudanese minister of national defense drew up a plan to train the Sudanese armed forces in China. And more cooperation was promised in 2007 between chiefs of each country's armed forces to develop the military relations of the two countries (AmnestyInt'l, 2006). Doing this, China is backing by providing weapons, giving training to its cadet, so it is backing the Sudan government in domestic conflict. According a rebel fighter in Darfur in 2006, (cited in, HRF, 2007):-

China is enemy number one, said an official of the southern side in the North-South civilwar. They are the ones who kept Bashir in power for so long, providing him with weapons totroy and win the war in the South. They are the ones who supplied him with helicopter gunships on the attacks on Bentiu (District of Darfur), and other places. They are evil. They are the ones providing military support to the government on Darfur; Of course they are (HRF,2007:8).Likewise, the Sudanese government also has been acquiring military aircraft, light tanks and combat planes. Such aircraft have been used to carry out numerous human rights abuses through air raids for the displacement of people with the oil revenue (Shinn, &Eisenman, 2005:16). For instance, in 2001, sixty percent of the government's oil revenue went towards military spending (ibid).

China has several reasons for wanting Khartoum to remain well armed. For one thing,arms sales provide Khartoum with an incentive to keep giving China

preferential access to oil. And Beijing has used arms exports to Sudan, to facilitate oil extracting deals with Chinese companies and to inter Sudan's oil exploration and production (HRF, 2008:25). Secondly, as the country (Sudan), continuously at war with itself for many years, it is considered as valuable customer of arms. And thirdly, as Chinese state-owned enterprise are under threat from different timely rebellions in Sudan, it is believed, they are used as a protection for their companies by Sudanese military forces (ibid). Although China and Sudan were condemned by the international community and Human rights organizations for their military cooperation. Sudan claims that, the primary objective of a country is to maintain law and order. Doing this, Sudan has a rationality to buy weapons and protect its citizens and the governance as a whole from external atrocities, threats and instability.<sup>12</sup> China on the other hand has a national objective to maximize its interest either by selling its manufactured products such as weapons and making diplomatic deals with other independent states.

## **7. Challenges of their Relations:**

At the outset it should be noted that, China's approach to Sudan should not be seen separately from that of the continent as a whole. As noted in previous chapter, the most obvious reason that, compelled China for close relations with Sudan is to secure energy, to fuel its rapid economic growth and foreign markets for its manufactured products, and equally important in searching of diplomatic partner (China Monitor, 2005). Doing this, extracting of the untapped resources, investment opportunities and diplomatic partnership have been a basic interaction of China-Sudan contemporary relations. To this end, they have encountered different constraints to realize their desired relations. These could be categorized into external pressure and internal dynamics. Externally, pressure imposed from Western countries was a main obstacle to consolidate their relations. Equally, Sudan's internal dynamics, such as security problems, South-Sudan independence are considered as impediments.

### **7.1 External Factor:**

The presence of China in Sudan was a main point of discussion in the international arena since its appearance, by human right activists, politicians and policy makers alike. This was connected with its aggressive approach of foreign policies to extract resources, but its ignorance for human rights, good governance, and corruption facilitated by its principle of non-interference. Therefore, this section will attempt to see the external factors retarded their bilateral relations.

## **7.2. Western Countries' Response to Chinese Presence in Sudan:**

Western countries' oil companies were engaged in Sudan prior to China's arrival for oil exploration. Among these, Chevron Oil Company from USA commenced oil exploration in 1970s, and withdrew in 1992 (Patey, 2007). And Talisman from Canada was highly engaged in these activities in the 1980s. However, it resigned from the country due to security problems in Sudan and damaging Western public pressure for their alignment with the Sudan Government (Alden, 2005). Having this, China substituted them through its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), since the mid, 1990. Then after, it was condemned, violated and discredited by the eye of the Western countries, human rights activists and pressure groups and intellectuals for backing the Sudan regime (Safeworld, 2012:90).

The international community's concerns about the Chinese presence in Africa range from preserving normative cosmopolitan ideals such as the protection of human rights, political freedoms to fears about diminishing western political and material influence in Africa. As with the local responses, international views are mixed, though there is a predominance of a negative perception about Chinese activities in Africa (Padriag, et.al 2007:2).

China has been portrayed as exercising "irresponsible global leadership" because of its resource, particularly oil and security interests and has been accused of hiding behind a commitment to non-interference policy in order to pursue a "predatory" foreign policy in Africa thereby grabbing Africa's resources without any "moral principle." In the UN Security Council, it has used its veto right to "undermine" sanctions against the Sudanese government, which has refused to co-operate with the African Union (AU) and the UN on the deployment of a large peacekeeping force to end the crisis in Darfur that has already killed hundreds of thousands of people. To quote Zafar (2007:104). lack of attention resistance to governance, democracy, and human rights issues in Africa, as testified by its support of pariah regimes in Sudan and its delinking of aid from political reform, has raised concerns that the flow of Chinese aid caused, African governments to delay reforms that promote openness and accountability. Given the propensity for corruption in the management of natural resources, China's lack of attention to matters of resource transparency and mechanisms of oversight among its African partners has been a cause for concern for Westerners to impose more pressures. Specifically, its policy of consolidating the military power of the regime in Sudan to gain influence and secure resources has been internationally condemned (Enkua, 2010:103). Western media and human rights organizations suggested and Chinese military assistance and arms exports have contributed to the security crisis in the conflict ridden areas of Darfur, Human Rights Watch (2007) has reported that weapons delivered from China to Sudan, included,

ammunition, tanks, helicopter, and fighter aircraft since 1995 have aggravated the war making activities and extensively transcended gross human rights (Indun, 2006:22).

Since the entrant of China into Sudan, lobbies against Sudan's human rights violation have been telling China's CNPC to divest out of Sudan and take a firm, moral stand against the crimes perpetrated by the Khartoum regime, particularly in the Darfur conflict. Since Sudan's oil revenue is funneled into strengthening the military and procuring arms and equipment, the CNPC has been accused of indirectly supporting Sudan's human rights violations. This issue has become a bone of contention between China and the West. Thus, to Beijing, the conflict in Darfur, however atrocious it may be, is Khartoum's internal business (Edinger, 2008).

China made its stand quite clear by inviting al-Bashir to Beijing a week before South Sudan claimed independence. Western nations condemned China for not arresting al-Bashir, against whom arrest warrants were issued by the International Criminal Court in 2009 and 2010 (ICC, 15 July, 2010). Of course, China has been denigrated by the west, branded as a 'threat' and characterized as dishonest, deceitful and mysterious. China was also seen as an ideological threat to Africa when the continent gained independence (Mawdsley, 2008). These old labels, have been given a new impetus in years, due to China's increased engagement with Africa; terms such as new scramble, new imperialism and China threat have become increasingly common (Large 2008a). China's foreign policy and its consequence of non-interference policy with African partners such as Sudan is further criticized; as it is promoting aid without any preconditions to these rogue states of Africa is advertising of corruption and retarded good governance (Naim 2007: 1). As critically stated by, Tull 2006: Beijing uses the pillars of its foreign policy, notably unconditional respect for states over eighty and its corollary, non-interference, in the pursuit of its interests, be they energy security, multi-polarity or the One China principle. To achieve these goals, Beijing is prepared to defend autocratic regimes that commit human rights abuses and forestall democratic reforms for narrow ends for narrow ends of regime survival (Tull, 2006:476). In a tour to Africa, in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized that the United States promoted human rights and democracy which China's approach in Sudan and in Africa at large stating as "even when it might be easier or more profitable to look the other way i.e. ignoring of human rights and promoting of bad governance adding not every partner makes that choice, but we do and we will" (The Guardian, 2012: 1). These comments were criticized in Chinese media, and seen to be a deliberate attempt to undermine China- Africa relations (Reuters, 19 May, 2012).

Numerous NGOs and campaigners worked tirelessly to bring Darfur to the world's attention with undoubted success and impose pressure on China-Sudan (Mamdani, 2009). Human Rights groups argued "China was, the principal impediment to a swift decisive action and identified it as indispensable to Sudan and as having significant important leverage over the Government of Sudan (GOS), as a result (Houser and Levy 2008: 63). Therefore, putting pressure on the relations of the two countries, either independently or together is a main element to resolve the conflict in Darfur in the short and detach China's relation with Sudan in the long (Ibid).

For this fact, external pressures, including international outrage over atrocities in Darfur which reached an upsurge in 2007 (Jakobson 2009: 420). Despite this, China's leaders have repeatedly portrayed it as a responsible world power, and international criticism presented strong self interested reasons for Beijing to act (Jakobson 2009: 412; Large 2008a: 99). However, the impact should not be overstated, the trend toward deeper engagement on Sudan in China's diplomacy was differentiated before the 2008 Beijing Olympics which were connected to Sino Sudanese relations by way of , " genocide Olympics" campaign (Contessi, 2010: 329; Large 2008c: 99). "Save Darfur" was the most additional vocal advocacy group in this regard, in large part. American celebrity Mia Farrow, who supposedly found China guilty of cooperating with Sudan, she intended to use the " Beijing Olympics" as tool to enforce China (Farrow, 2007). Winning the Olympics was a dream for the Chinese government and its people, it was deemed to be China's "global coming out party" an opportunity to showcase China's rapid economic growth and newfound modernity and reputation (Carlson 2007: 252). The Olympic milestone was meant to be a global symbol of "China's new status and identity "winning the host rights means winning the respect, trust and favor, of the international community (Wang, cited in Budabin 2011: 141). Mia Farrow coined the term, "Genocide Olympics" and it quickly became part of everyday language. Three months after the term's first use there was a 400% increase on the previous three months in the number of newspaper articles linking China to Darfur (Hamilton 2011).

Consequently, as the violent killing in Darfur drew increasing foreign media attention, Beijing's close ties with Bashir's regime in Khartoum became detrimental to China's reputation. Heavy international criticism was centered on China's sale of small arms to Sudan, its opposition to anti-Darfur resolutions in the United Nations, and Beijing's general failure to leverage its influence on the Bashir administration to foster peace. Furthermore, as the International Criminal Court indicted President al-Bashir for genocide, the Darfur advocacy campaign culminated in massive protests against the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

### **7.3. Internal Dynamics**

#### **7.3.1. Security factor**

Oil investments since 1999 have exacerbated local grievances, and heightened North/South disparities in Sudan (Large and Patey 2011: 188). Moro (2011: 70-71), further, underlines land dispossession without compensation, environmental damage, a lack of local consultations, and heightened conflict as new infrastructure, such as roads and airstrips, facilitated the activities of the Sudanese Armed Forces. In spite of Chinese companies claim to be balancing these ramifications with development assistance, building schools and health care facilities. Moro argues that, these claims are refuted by local populations (Moro, 2011: 73). He added that, “some development projects have indeed been implemented by oil companies but their positive impacts, if any, is limited. Such projects have been implemented without consultation with the intended beneficiaries, and are mostly small benevolent interventions” (Ibid: 85).

Not surprisingly the perception of Sudanese reveal rather than presenting Sudan with an alternative development opportunity, Chinese investments contributed in facilitating the aggressive policies of the Government of Sudan, Large and Patey (2011: 181) further, argue, China’s engagement blends into a longer history of top-down, centralized disempowerment and deprived “authoritarian development.” In Sudan, a system of petrol patronage exists, whereby rent-seeking elites have maintained power through the revenue accrued from oil exports (Ibid: 180). In Sudan, oil revenue has transformed Sudan regime into a Corporation with an unrestrained lust for wealth and power (Large and Patey 2011:181). Askouri noted this as: Sudan is often cited as the most prominent example of China’s support for an undemocratic and repressive regime, and where its non-interference principle has been most criticized. China is the main investor in Sudan’s oil exploration, chemical industry and rail transport. China has sold arms to Sudan and there are claims that these have been used to fuel the conflict in Darfur. China has also supported Sudan in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, threatening to use its veto against attempts to impose an oil embargo on Sudan(Askouri, 2007: 74-85).

Chinese engagement has not radically altered Sudan prospects for development, but rather become part of an established structure of marginalization by an authoritative elite and significant sum of money extravagated at the expense of the poor, which obliged them to quarrel and lose their trust on the regime and the Chinese. Hence, the oil industry in Sudan has been a bone of contention between local people, the government and the Chinese companies at large (Jakobson 2009: 419). Particularly significant was the issue of anti-Chinese sentiment within African people ingeneral and in that of Sudan in particular (Saferworld 2011: 13). China’s



entrenched role in Sudan's internal politics has significantly challenged China's engagement and foreign policy. As critiqued, "following a top-down economic development approach, i.e. not from grass-root level, Chinese economic assistance has encouraged elitism, deepened social and class divisions and widened corruption" (Askouri 2007: 72). China's relationship with Khartoum, and the impacts that investments have had for local populations has meant that, China is increasingly linked with the politics of the Government of Sudan. (Ibid: 81). This author remarks that, "China and Sudan are joining hands to uproot poor people, expropriate their land and appropriate their natural resource." (Ibid:81). As a Darfur fighter stated, (cited in, HRF).

China is enemy number one, said an official of the southern side in the North-South civil war. They are the ones who kept Bashir in power for so long, providing him with weapons to try and win the war in the South. They are the ones who supplied him with helicopter gunships on the attacks on Bentiu (District of Darfur), and other places. They are evil. They are the ones providing military support to the government on Darfur; Of course they are (HRF,2007:8).

Consequently," China faced security issue as well in Sudan." In 2004, two Chinese workers were abducted from western Sudan by rebels (China Daily, 2004; Holslag 2008). Equivalently, in 2007, the Darfur rebels attacked an oil field, and abducted two workers, quoting the head of the rebel group in Kordofan, and further warned that, "the latest attack is a message to the Chinese companies in particular, the Chinese companies are the biggest investors in the Sudanese oil industry which incorporate the regime in power" (Osman, 2007). And, in 2008, nine Chinese CNPC workers were abducted in Southern Kordofanian five were subsequently killed by forces under a commander claiming affiliation with the Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement, citing as the reason the exclusion of local populations from oil wealth (Large 2009: 618). According to Large, (2008b:6), many nongovernmental actors in Sudan- including the Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) declared China as their enemy.

In January 2012, 29 Chinese workers were kidnapped while working on a construction project, along the North-South borders by, rebel remnants of the SPLM who remained in the North after secession. This incident represented the third case of abduction of Chinese working in Sudan since 2004, as Chinese workers became increasingly attractive targets for Sudanese rebels hoping to leverage China to put pressure on Bashir's administration(Wee, 2012).

It is clear that, China's engagement with the regime has brought about were insecurity and threatened its main stay. As Holslag (2009:25) stated, China's economic ambitions have been repeatedly "spoiled by Sudan's gloomy security climate which enable to think critically to resume going out from Sudan." From 2004 onwards, escalating violence in Darfur put Chinese oil operations at risk and oil workers have been directly threatened by separatist groups, and many oil wells are in conflict prone areas and imposed them to search alternatives (Holslag 2008: 74). In spite of Sudan being important oil producer, its proven reserves still constituting only 5% of the total in Africa (Downs 2007:46), financing new alternatives would allow China to diversify its investment portfolio and avoid reliance on a single country for energy security. Taking the first steps to do so, Chinese enterprise, Sinopec purchased its first overseas upstream assets from Angola for \$2.46 billion in 2010 (Lee, 2010). Besides security problem, the post-peace, relations between the two Sudanese has been strained, with disagreements over division of oil revenues and border demarcation ongoing as of writing, and continued conflicts in Nuba and Abyei, making the region conflict-ridden area (Dange 2011: 18; Gentleman 2012; ICG 2012; Johnson 2011: 170). These uncertainties have pushed China more to search alternative oil out-put out of Sudan. Things became worse after; South Sudan cut off all oil production in protest against Khartoum and proposed oil transit fees, in January, 2012 (Gettleman 2012; ICG, 2012: 21).

China, with majority holdings in GNPC which operates chiefly in South Sudanese regions, was forced into an increasingly uncomfortable position. Most importantly, as stated in section 4.2, China's motives and deriving factor to come to Sudan was in search of oil. But the share of Sudanese oil in China's overall oil imports has declined after reaching "the high-water mark of 2001-2" due to quality of oil (Large 2008:285). Or "due to the overall effects of factors such as the mediocre quality of crude oil in Sudan" the emergence of more and more replacement oil suppliers in Africa, the possible declination of both Sudanese oil wealth, and the increasing attention towards oil reserves in Sudan domestically" all these contemplated China to retreat from Sudan (Sandres, 2012).

### **Conclusion:**

The study has attempted to assess post Cold War Sino-Sudan, political relations. The common denominator that pressed to discuss were the elements of challenges and opportunities of their relations. Politically, China's approach of noninterference emanated from its foreign policy, its human rights policies and its impact in Sudan, military relations of the two countries, China's reflection to the ICC in respect of Sudan seen as a drawback of the countries relation. And economically; trade, investment relations of the two countries and infrastructure development were employed to discuss. The study also unraveled the challenges of their relations

which encompassed external pressure and internal dynamics. The most contested factor for the relations between the two countries' is predominantly aggregated on the non-interference principle. Its main tenet was non-interference in the domestic affairs of any sovereign state, where domestic issues of a sovereign state is exclusively the legitimate right of that state to decide. Doing this, China was reluctant to cooperate with the international institutions such as the UN adhered to the principle. In the Darfur conflict, the UNSC critically condemned the Sudan government for its human rights violations. Consequently, it passed successive resolutions to subdue the regime. However, China watered down and refuted these resolutions by abstaining from vote or objected them using its veto power in the Council.

What is noteworthy is that, China's stand on behalf of Sudan applauded the government to exacerbate its oppressive and repressive actions on its people. China was worked in obstructing international punitive and humanitarian action in the name of protecting Sudan's territorial sovereignty. Meanwhile, Beijing's close ties with the regime became detrimental to its reputation globally. Heavy international criticism led to its relations with the West and human rights activists getting deteriorated effects. Consequently, western countries, pressure groups, celebrity individuals and civil societies were imposed extensive pressure on the two countries against their cooperate atrocities. Similarly, as a result of China's cooperation with the regime, also, incurred a challenge within Sudan for their harmonious relationships. It faced security threats from liberation movements and militia factions. To this end, Chinese employee in Sudan was killed, kidnapped by these groups in order to exert pressure on China. But China was claimed that, the conflict in Sudan was as a result of backwardness and poverty, to this end it was actively engaged in balancing of the government and the militants by dividing the oil revenue and in promoting peaceful solutions for the conflict.

In short, politically, China was a major partner in defending and protecting the Khartoum regime from external pressure by refuting subsequent resolutions endorsed by the UN Security Council and providing necessary weapons to tackle its civil war.

Generally, China's political activities in Sudan are able to produce opportunities for the country's development. This is because the Sudanese government crafted, carefully handled and implemented policies that can promote the desired prospective outcomes from the two countries relations. This implies that, the presence of China in Sudan is not as an exploiter and exploited relationship. Rather, it is a complementary approach which enables the two countries to exchange the resources, the capability, the capital and the skills they have. In similar vein, Sudan

was also a major ally of China in adding numerical advantage with other African countries to vote in favor of China and tackling their common negligence by the west. Since, the intent of this study was to examine and explore the political and economic relations between the two countries.

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