

Peace Operations in Northern Ghana: A Comparative Analysis of State-Sponsored Peace Operations in the Dagbon, Konkomba-Nanumba and Nawuri-Gonja Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana

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Abstract

It is axiomatic that state-sponsored peace operations are conducted in Ghana aimed at combating conflicts. In the Dagbon intra-ethnic conflict and the Nawuri-Gonja and Konkomba-Nanumbainter-ethnic conflicts in present-day Northern Region of Ghana, state-sponsored peace operations were marshalled to either prevent the outbreak of conflicts, de-escalate tensions or combat the conflicts to ensure law and order. Some of the security measures rolled out as part of the peace operations in these conflicts included strategies such as a combined military-police patrols, mounting checkpoints to prevent the inflow of arms, the imposition of state of emergency, increasing security presence in the volatile areas, among others. This paper explores the security arrangements in the peace operations in the Dagbon, Konkomba-Nanumba and Nawuri-Gonja conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana. Blending written and unwritten data together in an orthodox historical tradition, this study argues that the measures were not entirely successful.

Key Words: 1.Dagbon, 2.Dagomba, 3.Conflicts, 4.Gonja, 5.Konkomba, 6.Military, 7.Nanumba, 8.Nawuri, 9.Peace, 10.Police, 11.Operations, 12.Security

Introduction

Overview: The Trend of Conflicts in Northern Ghana

Since the outbreak of the inter-ethnic conflict between the Nanumba and the Konkomba in 1981, the former Northern Region of Ghana (now split into Northern Region, North-East Region and Savanna Region) had witnessed a number of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts on an unprecedented scale. Between 1981 and 2020, there have been conflicts between the Nawuri and

the Gonja in 1991 and 1992; intra-ethnic conflict among the Dagomba in 2002; inter-ethnic conflicts between the Konkomba, the Gonja and Nanumba in 1994; and an inter-ethnic clash between the Konkomba and the Anufor (Chakosi) in the Chereponi District in present-day North-East Region in a recurrent dispute over land in 2018 and 2019. Other conflicts included the Konkomba-Bimoba conflict in 1984, 1986, 1989 and 2015; the intra-ethnic conflict among the Dagomba in Karaga and Gushiegu in 1991; and the intra-ethnic conflict among the Gonja at Yapei and Daboya in 1992 and 1994, respectively (Awedoba, 2009; Lentz, 2007a, 2007b; Brukum, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2007; Mbowura, 2012; Anamzoya and Tonah, 2012, 2016; Braimah and Mbowura, 2018). There were many other conflicts that broke out in the region within the space of four decades between 1981 and 2020. Given the spate of conflicts in the region, it is commonsense that peace operations would be mounted to put in place security measures to prevent, combat and de-escalate tensions.

Generally, scholars use the term ‘security’ in two broad categorizations, namely, state-centred and non-state centred security. In the case of the state-centred security, security is analyzed in relation to the state including the security mechanisms of state and para-security agencies. In the case of the non-state centred security, security is analyzed in relation to human lives, that is, human security and the activities of non-state security actors (Bellany, 1981; Alkire, 2003). In Ghana, the security landscape is made up of state and non-state security actors. (Badong, 2009). As Badong (2009:6) put it, “the security landscape in Ghana is diverse and not homogeneous, with various actors operating outside the state mechanism to provide security to various segments of the population.”

Over the years, African states since independence have been active stakeholders in peace operations in Africa and across the globe as part of measures to resolve conflicts (Kotia, 2015). Since independence in 1957, Ghana has since “been an active contributor to peace operations” in Africa and other continents (Kotia, 2015). Internally, there are a number of measures and peace operations initiated by the Government of Ghana to protect lives and properties, and ensure law and order (Aning, 2006 and 2015; Adu-Mireku, 2002; Addae et al., 2020; Appiah and Suuribemaa, 2020). It is to strengthen internal security that the Government of Ghana passed the Security and Intelligence Agency Act, 2020, “an Act relating to National Security Council, to provide for the establishment of regional and district security councils, to specify and coordinate the activities of the agencies responsible for the security of the State and to protect and preserve the unity and stability of the State and to provide for related matters” (Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020: 3).

This paper is situated within the context of state-centred security and internal peace operations. It discusses state-sponsored peace operations within the context of conflict prevention and the combat of conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana. The paper subjects the peace operations in conflicts in the region to critical analysis to determine their successes and failures.



Map of Northern Region of Ghana (Source: Ghana Metrological Association). The areas of study in this paper are Yendi Municipality, Nanumba North District, Nanumba South District and Kpandai District.

Studies on Conflicts in Northern Ghana

Studies on conflicts in Northern Ghana are diverse, but can be conveniently classified into two main categories. The first category consists of studies on conflicts in Northern Ghana from different disciplines and perspectives that examined the historical antecedents, structures and dynamics of the conflicts. The general body of literature that adopted this approach, which I prefer to refer to as the traditional approach, examined the colonial and/or the non-colonial antecedents of conflicts in Northern Ghana, as well as their conduct and stages of manifestations. This was particularly the approach to the study of conflicts in Northern Ghana adopted in the works of Brukum (1999, 2000, 2001 and 2007), Anamzoya and Tonah (2012), Bogner (2009), Awedoba (2009), Lentz (2007), Tolton (2010), Skalnik (1983, 1987), Jonsön (2007), among others. This body of literature laid the foundation for the sprouting of the second approach (the

non-traditional approach) to the study of conflicts in Northern Ghana. The second approach goes beyond the historical and sociological dissection of the antecedents and structures of conflicts in Northern Ghana. It focuses its attention on other elements of conflicts such as peace operations, gender dimensions of conflicts, the youth and conflicts, religion and magic in conflicts, post-conflict configuration of peace and social order, among others. Some of the works that have applied this approach to the study of conflicts in Northern Ghana included the works of Mbowura (2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016, 2020, 2021 & 2022), Mohammed (2007), Tonah (2007), Bombande (2007), Anamzoya and Tonah (2016), Tonah (2005), Longi (2013), Adjei (2016), Bogner and Neubert (2016), Borgner (2009), van der Kinde and Naylor (1999), among others. It should be pointed out that these categorizations are not rigid, as there are cases where some scholars combined both approaches in their works. For instance, Mbowura (2012), Braimah and Mbowura (2018), Awedoba (2009), Pellow (2016), Longi (2016), among others, combined both traditions in the study of conflicts in Northern Ghana.

This study is patterned along the non-traditional approach. It does not concern itself with the historicity of the antecedents and structures of conflicts in Northern Ghana; it undertakes a comparative assessment of the peace operations undertaken by state security agencies in the Dagbon conflict of 2002, the Konkomba-Nanumba conflicts of 1994 and 1995, and the Nawuri-Gonja conflict of 1991/1992.

Peace Operations in Conflicts in Northern Ghana

It is common knowledge that state security is crucial to peace operations. This is because “when a nation is unable to contain and resolve crises, it loses its legitimacy by failing to assure the basic security of citizens from human rights abuses, crime and physical violence” (Kodia, 2015: 7). As part of its mandate to provide security for the citizenry, the Government of Ghana prosecuted a variety of peace operation mechanisms in the wake of the conflicts in Northern Ghana. Some of the measures undertaken by government security agencies in the peace operations in conflicts in Northern Ghana included swoops, patrols and surveillance, overseeing the signing of peace pacts, intensifying security in volatile areas, among others. Some of the peace operations mechanisms adopted in the conflicts in Yendi, Kpandai and Bimbilla in the present-day Northern Region of Ghana are discussed in this subsection.

Confiscations of Arms

In Ghana, as it is the case in other parts of Africa, state sponsored peace operations are in the heart of the combat of conflicts. In fact, the role of the state in conflicts in Africa goes beyond peace operations; it extends to the peace-making and peacebuilding processes. As Bogner and Neubert (2016: 258) argued, “the increase in the importance of the state is revealed by the social process which precede, accompany and follow the end of an armed conflict.” In the wake of the

conflicts in Kpandai, Bimbilla and Yendi, state security agencies, either the police or a combined police-military team, undertook arms confiscation as part of the peace operations. This measure was applied to the conflicts with varying degrees of success and implementation. In the case of the Nawuri-Gonja conflict in Kpandai in 1991, the application of the confiscation of arms triggered the crystallization of the perception of police unprofessionalism. As the drift to war between the Nawuri and the Gonja reached a climax, the police attempted to diffuse tension by searching the homes of the Nawuri and the Gonja in Kpandai to retrieve arms. This operation was carried out on 6th April, 1991, a day before the actual outbreak of armed conflict between the two protagonists. It was reported that the exercise succeeded in retrieving large quantities of weapons from the Gonja and the Nawuri (Ampiah, 1991; Mbowura, 2012; Mbowura, 2014c). One would have expected that the exercise would have prevented the outbreak of armed conflict between the Nawuri and the Gonja, but the reverse was the case. As Mbowura (2020: 81) put it, “presumably, the retrieval of the weapons was seen as a means of preventing the outbreak of war as it would deny the Nawuri and the Gonja of combative arms, but this was a mistaken supposition.” The exercise was unsuccessful for two main reasons. First, its implementation adopted a half-hearted approach. The search for arms in Nawuri and Gonja houses was limited to Kpandai; it was not extended to other settlements dotted around Kpandai. As one informant put it:

It is unconceivable to prosecute such an important exercise in such a horrendous manner. The police were fully aware that the Nawuri in Kpandai, for example, constituted just about ten percent of the population of the Nawuri in the conflict enclave. Hence, restricting the search of arms in the homes of the Nawuri in Kpandai was a serious blunder. At the same time, the configuration of ethnic relations and social bonds of the Nawuri and the Gonja in Kpandai in particular made it practically illogical to restrict the search for arms in Kpandai to only Nawuri and Gonja homes. Aware that the police would search for arms in their homes, it was possible that the Nawuri and the Gonja in Kpandai would hide their arms in the homes of their friends of other ethnic groups such as Konkomba, Bassari, Kotokoli, among others. (KambouGaou, personal communication, 24th December, 2021).

From the quotation, it is evident that the futility of the arms confiscation scheme is blamed on the ineffectiveness of the prosecution of the scheme. It was due to the failure of the police to implement the confiscation of arms exercise on a wide scale inhibited its eventual success. The second reason for the failure of the scheme is the perception of bias it generated among the Nawuri against the police (Mbowura, 2012 and 2014). The Nawuri maintained that the police were unprofessional in the execution of the arms confiscation scheme (Mbowura, 2012 and 2014c). Nawuri sources claimed that their spies found that the Gonja restocked arms in the midnight after the police had conducted the exercise, and that, though they informed the police, no action was taken to retrieve the arms from the Gonja (Ampiah, 1991; Mbowura, 2012 and 2014c). According to the Nawuri, the restocked arms by the Gonja were either brought from Salaga and other Gonja settlements or that they were the arms which the police had retrieved

from them earlier in the day (Mbowura, 2012 and 2014). Whatever was the interpretation of the source of the supposedly arms restocked by the Gonja, two things were clear. First, no entry of the Nawuri complaint existed in the diary of the Kpandai Police in Kpandai (Ampiah, 1991; Mbowura, 2020, 2014c & 2020). Second, the incident led to the crystallization of Nawuri perception of police bias in favour of the Gonja (Mbowura, 2012, 2014c & 2020). It was this particular situation which pushed the Nawuri to take measures to rearm themselves for a war that they considered was bound to break out (Mbowura, 2020).

The application of the arms confiscation scheme to the volatile situations in Bimbilla also led to the crystallization of the perception of police unprofessionalism and favouritism (Brukum, 2001). The scheme, rather than prevent the outbreak of armed conflict, hastened the drift to war between the Konkomba and the Nanumba. As tensions increased and as the drift to war between the Konkomba and the Nanumba in Bimbilla and its environs became a possibility, the police mounted checkpoints on the Bimbilla-Kpandai road to prevent the inflow of firearms to Bimbilla and its environs. This peace operation exercise was necessary as there were “reports that both Konkomba and Nanumba had transported weapons through the area from Southern Ghana” (Tolton, 2010: 173). The exercise was successful in intercepting and confiscating Nanumba arms from Accra bound for Bimbilla (Talton, 2010). However, for inexplicable reasons, the police did not confiscate Konkomba arms that were intercepted in the exercise. Instead, the Konkomba arms were released to their owners after a brief discussion with the police (Talton, 2010). The failure of the police to leverage the application of the arms confiscation scheme created a simmering state of discontent among the Nanumba, leading to the Nanumba perception that the police were unprofessional and partisan (Tolton, 2010). In the view of Brukum (2001), it was this arson attack that eventually led to the outbreak of the armed conflict between the Konkomba and the Nanumba in Bimbilla in 1994. Thus, rather than prevent the outbreak of armed conflict, the arms confiscation scheme in Bimbilla led to unintended consequences.

In Yendi, no similar arms confiscation scheme was implemented prior to the outbreak of the intra-ethnic conflict between the Andani and the Abudu Gates of the Dagomba. Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, reports of a drift to war between the two gates in Yendi were rife. The reports gave indications of preparations of the factions to obtain the needed logistics for armed conflict. Despite reports of stock-piling of arms for purposes of war by the two gates in Yendi, the security found the application of arms to the volatile situation in Yendi implausible. As the Wuako Commission pointed out:

there were reports of secret meetings among the various factions, fund raising towards the purchase of arms and logistics, infiltration of arms and ammunition into Yendi and stockpiling of arms in neighbouring villages. Indeed, fear and panic gripped the people of Yendi, some of whom had planned to flee the town in anticipation of factional clashes (Wuako, 2002: 66).

Though reports of arms stocking for the purposes of armed conflict were rife, the security agencies realized the futility of the application of the arms confiscation scheme to the volatile situation in Yendi. This was partly informed by the unsuccessfulness of the application of the scheme in Yendi in 2001 by the Ministry of Interior (Wuako, 2002). However, the non-application of arms confiscation scheme to the situation in Yendi did not yield the intended consequences, as the measure did not prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts between the two parties.

Visible Security Presence and Patrols

One ubiquitous measure common to all peace operations in conflicts in Northern Ghana is patrols of security operatives in conflict zones. This measure was applied to the conflicts in Kpandai, Yendi and Bimbilla with varying degrees of effects. In Kpandai, REGSEC, through the Northern Regional Police Command, deployed police personnel to Kpandai to increase police visibility in the town and its environs (Mbowura, 2012). Accounts of eyewitnesses vary about the impact of this measure in Kpandai. To some, it was poorly organized; to others, it had mixed effects as it succeeded in the short term in maintaining peace and security until things got out of hand when the war between the Nawuri and the Gonja eventually broke out. In his assessment of the police visibility and patrol strategy, an informant argued:

the strategy was not well-thought out. The police only limited their patrols to the principal streets in Kpandai. There was little or no police presence in the other parts of the town, thus giving the war entrepreneurs ample advantage to secretly meet to advance their course for the conflict. The situation was even worse in the various Nawuri settlements dotted around Kpandai, and this made it possible for the Nawuri to have the unfettered advantage to plan for the conflict (DonkorGaou, personal communication, 23rd December, 2021)

Mama Hassan, (personal communication, 23rd December, 2021) had a different verdict on this strategy. According to him:

the presence of the police and their patrol activities, the first of the kind, ensured effective security in Kpandai. The concentration of the activities of the police in Kpandai was because it was the epicenter of the encounters between the Nawuri and the Gonja, as there were hardly any Gonja inhabitants in the villages dotted around Kpandai. Hence, the concentration of the patrols of the police in Kpandai succeeded in de-escalating tension, until the unfortunate killing of a Nawuri man, which sparked off the inter-ethnic conflict (Mama Hassan, personal communication, 23rd December, 2021).

The Nawuri blame the police and their patrol team in Kpandai for the outbreak and escalation of the conflict in Kpandai. They argue that the police patrol team was unprofessional as there were clear signs of bias against the Nawuri (Mbowura, 2012). According to a Nawuri informant:

The Nawuri perceived the police to be unprofessional in the discharge of their duties. Their ambience and perceived fixation on protecting the Gonja made the Nawuri to feel that the police personnel were brought to Kpandai to advance the course of the Gonja. Matters worsened when the Nawuri reported the killing of Anekor (a Nawuri and the first victim of the armed conflict) to the police, but the police refused to go to the Nawuri section to pick his mortal remains. Nawuri feelings aggravated when some Nawuri men wielding arms reported to their colleagues that the police arrested them and seized their arms, but spared their Gonja counterparts (AttahAnawusa, personal communication, 26th December, 2021).

Whatever was the viewpoint of inhabitants about the effectiveness of those police patrols in Kpandai, one thing was clear: the police found it difficult to prevent the outbreak of the conflict. Despite this difficulty, the police continued to hold the fort until the task of peace operations in Kpandai was extended to the military. A military team was deployed to Kpandai on June 23, 1991, to maintain peace, law and order (Mbowura, 2012). The inclusion of the military in the peace operations in Kpandai ensured effective patrolling, and made the return to law and order a possibility. However, after six months of peace operations in Kpandai, the military operatives were recalled to their barracks in Tamale, the regional capital (Mbowura, 2012). The withdrawal of the military in the peace operations in Kpandai was catastrophic. It led to the renewal of hostilities, and this once again proved the incapacity of the police to maintain law and order in Kpandai (Mbowura, 2014).

In Bimbilla, similar police patrols were mounted. However, as the drift to war gathered momentum, police visibility became thin. In the view of an informant who pleaded anonymity, “the disgust of the police in Bimbilla over the arson attack of the Nanumba youth on the police armoury was noticeable in their withdrawal from the patrols that they mounted before the incident. In retrospect, it was likely that police patrols in Bimbilla and its peripheries would have been conducted unabated if the unfortunate arson attack had not occurred” (Male informant, personal communication, 28th December, 2021).

In Yendi, the task of peace operations was extended to the military prior to the outbreak of the intra-ethnic conflict between the Abudu and the Andani Gates of the Dagomba. As tensions mounted in Yendi, the Regional Security Committee (REGSEC), through the Yendi District Security Committee (DISEC), banned the celebration of the *Bugum* Festival (Fire Festival) in Yendi and imposed a curfew on the township (Wuako, 2002). To maintain peace and prevent the outbreak of the intra-ethnic conflict, the task of peace operations was extended to the military. reparations were openly made (Wuako, 2002: 66). Consequently, police-military patrols were mounted in Yendi aimed at maintaining peace and preventing the outbreak of conflict. But the police-military patrols were halted when the Regional Minister (Honourable Prince ImoruAndani) intervened. Consequently, the military team in Yendi was withdrawn (Wuako, 2002). Military personnel were deployed to Yendi again when the drift to armed conflict became obvious.

Police-military patrols were resumed again, but it came too late; the drift to war had reached a point of no return.

From the above assessment, it is clear that the police or police-military patrols in Kpandai, Bimbilla and Yendi proved ineffective in the face of escalating tensions. These patrols could not prevent the outbreak of the armed conflicts. Whereas the case in Kpandai was blamed on police unprofessionalism that made the patrols ineffective in the first instance, the withdrawal of the military from Kpandai triggered a renewal of hostilities. The situation was different in Bimbilla and Yendi; Bimbilla's case was blamed on the arson attack on the police whereas the Yendi situation was occasioned by ambivalence in the implementation of the patrol scheme and security strategy in general.

Government Officials and Peace Operations

Given the symbiotic relations between the Government of Ghana and the security agencies in the provision of internal security, government officials sometimes interfered and determined the course and mechanisms adopted in peace operations. A case in point was the situation in Yendi. Without recourse to security intelligence, Honourable Prince Imoru Andani, then Northern Regional Minister, overturned the ban that the REGSEC imposed on the celebration of the *Bugum* Festival in Yendi for cultural reasons, arguing that the ban was inconsistent with the traditions of the Dagomba (Wuako, 2002: 67). His interventions also led to the curfew imposed on Yendi being lifted (Wuako, 2002). Uninformed by security advice, these political interventions, together with the withdrawal of the military from Yendi, made the drift to armed confrontations a possibility, as the interventions removed the hurdles to armed conflict. (Wuako, 2002: 67). In addition, mechanical and logistic problems conspired to inhibit the success of the military from preventing the escalation of the conflict when it broke out in March, 2002 (Wuako, 2002). For unknown reasons, the mystery of finding the ignition key, the faulty ignition battery and the faulty firing rifle of the armoured vehicle conspired to thwart the efforts of the military to move quickly through the firing lines of the combatants to disarm and/or disperse them (Wuako, 2002).

In Kpandai, there were perceptions that political influences determined the ambience of the peace operations. The Ampiah committee that investigated the conflicts between the Gonja and the Nawuri on the one hand, and the conflict between the Gonja and the Nchumuru on the other, blamed the porousness and paucity of security arrangements in the Nawuri-Gonja conflict to political interferences (Ampiah, 1991). According to the committee, the ease with which Gonja warriors from West, North and Central Gonja traversed through police checkpoints in Tamale, Yendi and Salaga to Kpandai to fight the Nawuri was probably due to the political influence of the Regional Secretary, John Bawa, a Gonja (Appiah, 1991: 63). Similarly, the committee pointed accusing fingers at the District Secretary for East Salaga (Mr. John Seidu Karim, a Gonja) for the failure of the district to put in place measures to prevent the Gonja from

transporting their warriors from Salaga to Kpandaito fight the Nawuri (Ampiah, 1991). It is difficult to discount these accusations, as it is axiomatic that political interventions are embedded in the general gamut of security measures rolled out in conflicts in Northern Ghana.

Government Interventions

Most times, the effectiveness of peace operations in Northern Ghana is a function of government's interventions. Prompt or late government interventions to security situations in conflict-torn areas affect the effectiveness of peace operations. Government interventions prior, during and after armed conflicts necessarily determine the character of peace operations in Northern Ghana (Mbowura, 2020). According to Mbowura (2020: 88), "government response to raging conflicts in Northern Ghana has not been entirely encouraging: it ranged from prolong delays to swift responses." Government's interventions in the 1994 Konkomba-Nanumba conflict together with other ethnic conflicts that raged the Northern Region at the same time was slow. Government's failure to respond to the conflicts and declare a state of emergency was delayed until after ten days of intense fighting among the combatants (Linde and Naylor, 1998). One of the reasons for the failure of the government to respond swiftly to the conflicts was the poor communication network in the Northern Region, as well as the poor communication link between local and central government (Linde and Naylor, 1998). According to Linde and Naylor (1998: 41), the poor communication link between local and central government led to a situation where "reports by government officials, political leaders and chiefs that were eventually transmitted to regional authorities were not clearly acknowledged or quickly acted upon." Eventually, when the central government responded in the raging conflicts, its interventions came too late to warrant any effectiveness in the peace operations of the security personnel in dealing with the conflicts.

Conclusion

The paper examined peace operations in Northern Ghana in the context of the security measures applied to the security situations in Kpandai, Bimbilla and Yendi prior, during and after the conflicts in those areas. The paper examined the arms confiscation schemes, security patrols, government interventions and political interferences in the peace operations in the conflicts in Kpandai, Bimbilla and Yendi. From the analysis, the paper established that the peace operation measures were ineffective. The arms confiscation scheme as applied to the security situation in Kpandai could not prevent the outbreak of conflict; neither could it contain the conflict. Similarly, the arms confiscation scheme applied to the Bimbilla situation rather led to unintended consequence – an arson attack on the police armoury in Bimbilla which eventually made the drift to war closer than before. On the other hand, the non-application of the arms confiscation scheme to the prior war situation in Yendi in 2002 did not equally yield the intended

consequences. Security patrols in Kpandai, Bimbilla and Yendi formed part of the security measures of the peace operations in those areas. However, this measure was unsuccessful in preventing the outbreak of conflicts. Its application in the outbreak of the conflicts left much to be desired. Perhaps, the situation would have been different if political or perceived political interferences did not determine the course of the measures adopted in the peace operations. In both the situations in Kpandai and Yendi, perceived political interferences negatively affected the effectiveness of the security measures utilized in the peace operations. Finally, government's response to the outbreak of conflicts – delayed or swift – also determined the vicissitudes of the effectiveness of the security measures applied to the containment of conflicts in the Northern Region.

This paper has contributed to the non-traditional approach to the study of conflicts, as it provides a peace operations dimension to the study of conflicts in Northern Ghana. Apart from the peace operations flavour it adds to the study of conflicts in Northern Ghana, this study is significant because it provides useful lessons the measures adopted in the peace operations in Northern Ghana that can inform future peace operations. Finally, the paper provides blueprint upon which other researches on domestic peace operations in Ghana and other jurisdictions could be based.

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Interviews

Name	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
DonkorGaou	23 rd December, 2021	Kpandai, Northern Region, Ghana
Mama Hassan	23 rd December, 2021	Kpandai, Northern Region, Ghana
KambouGaou	24 th December, 2021	Kpandai, Northern Region, Ghana
AttahAnawusa	26 th December, 2021	Kpandai, Northern Region, Ghana